Introduction
"We trained hard….but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganised, [and] With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union, the monolithic threat to Western Europe disappeared and many governments took the opportunity to obtain a 'peace dividend'. This has meant the reduction of defence spending and the reallocation of those funds to other areas of public spending. However, the 'New World Order' has taken a direction, which is rather different from that forecast. Instead of the one major threat, there is now a multitude of smaller ones, which cannot be met with large conventional forces stationed in the Central Europe, but will have to be countered by smaller intervention forces capable of rapid deployment.
This reorientation, so far as the United Kingdom's Armed Forces were concerned, was announced in the Strategic Defence Review, in July 1998. It also recognised the need to do more with a smaller budget, given the rate of defence inflation (which is generally above normal economic inflation). Faced with criticism stretching back many years which accused the Ministry of Defence of having an over bureaucratic approach to procurement (Kincaid, , 1998 , failing to prevent high defence inflation and in-service date slippage, the Smart Procurement Initiative was announced as part of the Strategic Defence Review. It 3 is hoped that these "radical changes … will deliver a forward looking organisation using up to date acquisition processes and procedures. The emphasis will be on flexibility … and continuous evaluation to avoid any danger of stagnation." (Ministry of Defence, 1998, Supporting Essay 10, Paragraph 6) 'Faster, better, cheaper' (Ministry of Defence, 1998, Chapter 8, Paragraph 161) has become the new catch phrase for the supporters of change but for others, the change in mindset is a difficult proposition.
Smart Procurement involves a change from the previous Downey procurement cycle and a move to a more streamlined Acquisition cycle. The structure of this cycle aims to reduce risk by carrying out a more comprehensive assessment of projects at an earlier stage, while streamlining the approval process. (Jdir, 1998, p. 7) Formal approval has been reduced from three to two occasions, the first time is during the concept phase (Initial Gate) and between the assessment and demonstration phases (Main Gate).
Central to the implementation of Smart Procurement is the introduction of Integrated Project Teams, which are part of the drive to move from a functionally based management and reporting structure to a project based organisation. They will drive the management of major defence equipment procurement, balance the trade-offs between performance, cost and time, within boundaries set by the approving authority. These Teams will bring together all defence stakeholders and industry under a single team leader. They will be responsible for overseeing the complete lifecycle of the piece of equipment, and once in service, will move from 4 what was the Procurement Executive, now the Defence Procurement Agency, to the Defence Logistics Organisation where they will manage equipment support.
Since the announcement of Smart Procurement much has been written on the potential benefits that Integrated Project Teams will hopefully bring. It is supposed that they will improve the interface with industry, create a better understanding of requirements and establish an environment where industry is motivated to perform (DPA; Galloway, 1998; The Financial Times, 1998) and so reduce cost, risk and time into service while improving product quality. The formation of a team should provide continuity, consistency, flexibility and increased performance due to the integration of a wide-range of functional activities and decision-making, as well as increased motivation. These may well be gallant objectives, but how achievable are they? What obstacles does the Ministry of Defence face in the implementation and running of these Teams?
A Not-So-New, New Idea Integrated Project Teams have been described as the "centrepiece of Smart Procurement" (Nolan, 1998, p. 14) which itself has been described as a "revolution and complete cultural change in MoD procurement". (Cook, 1998, p. Teams will form during the concept phase where it is quite likely that industry will be 'co-opted' on to a team, rather than being a full member. This is because several companies would be involved in providing solutions as part of the User Requirement Document process. (Ministry of Defence, Smart Procurement: The Role of Industry, p. 4) It is here that the first problem of competition is apparent.
In order to produce an effective User Requirement Document, the Ministry of Defence requires industry to comment on aspects such as target costs, time scales and performance. Contractors will be loathe to pass on information that they feel will give a rival an advantage downstream. This will be even more apparent if 7 more than one company has been 'co-opted' into the project prior to the announcement of a prime contractor. At the same time, Smart Procurement concepts expect industry to be more willing to release data, than they have in the past. (Ministry of Defence, Smart Procurement: The Role of Industry, p. 4) Apart from stating that Team leaders will have to make arrangements to ensure that commercially sensitive information is protected from competitors, there is little advice on how this might be undertaken.
Once the competition has been launched by Invitation to Tender, the companies' 'co-opted' membership of the Integrated Project Team will be temporarily suspended. Contributions made by contractors during the previous phase would however, be taken into account during the selection process. There is a fear that this process will not generate fair competition. The Ministry of Defence could be accused at first glance of using the 'carrot' of favouritism during selection as an incentive to contractors to share information during the User Requirement Document phase. Furthermore, there must be a question of fairness in respect of a contractor who joins at the Invitation to Tender phase without having been a 'coopted' member. Smart Procurement will see the introduction of a segmented approach to acquisition. There will be three tiers: low risk and unit cost items, minor projects of intermediate scale and technical risk, and major projects characterised by substantial risk and high unit cost. (Ministry of Defence, 1998, Supporting Essay 10, Paragraph 11) It is the latter tier (major projects) that has received most of the attention so far, and provided a number of the Integrated Project Team pilot 8 projects announced under Smart Procurement. Teams will be formed for Tier 2 projects as well, but will be capability based, and responsible for more than one project. As an example, the Land Systems section of the Defence Procurement Agency established a Dismounted Close Combat Team responsible for fifty-two projects. (Brown, 1999) In this sort of situation, it will be difficult to manage contractor participation whilst guaranteeing no party gains a competitive advantage. This view has been taken by the Defence Procurement Agency who suggest that multiple equipment Teams will work for Commercial-off-the-Shelf procurement but not developmental ones where developers are reluctant to pass on technological information. (Hudson, 1999) Additionally, while there is no intention in the Strategic Defence Review to return to the cosy world of cost plus arrangements, post main production contract partnering seeks an environment where participants recognise common goals and work towards them creating a 'win-win' situation. This approach could invite accusations of mediocrity. The Defence Procurement Agency team members will be conscious of their responsibility for prudent management of the public purse, while industry members will feel a responsibility towards their shareholders.
There is a danger that "companies, confident that they will get work and support from their government, could lose interest in controlling costs and even quality". (Taylor, 1998, p. 42) While there may well be a middle ground, human nature doesn't always naturally seek it, and when the necessity to cut costs is removed, inefficiencies may develop. In order to avoid this, both sides must remain convinced as to the benefits of partnership, and contracts must be structured so as to allow industry to benefit from efficiencies achieved. In the longer term, 9 partnering post contract must support the ongoing viability of both Integrated Project Teams and industry. The Teams need to support the equipment through its life, at acceptable cost, and industry must remain profitable to survive. This is an area that must have further work. Industry must remain motivated so that it will enter a dialogue with the Ministry of Defence during the early stages of a project so that it can gauge requirements quickly and accurately. If this is not achieved, it is unlikely that equipment will be delivered on time, to specification or budget, and it will appear that the new procurement strategy is no better than the last.
Organisational Issues
There are a number of organisational issues that need to be addressed with regard to Integrated Project Teams. One of the major criticisms of previous efforts was the discontinuity and confusion arising out of the regular turnover of staff and the rotation of roles. (McKinsey & Co, 1998, p. 11 The creation of Integrated Project Teams will mean a coming together of people from different organisational and business cultures. Teams will have to overcome differences in public and private sector organisations where "the former has a need to spend money legally, whereas in commerce it must be spent efficiently." (Taylor, 1998, p. 41 ) A too closer relationship could see profit orientated companies exploiting the government by charging as much as possible. Industry tends to be less averse to risk than the Ministry of Defence and perceives that responsibility and authority are usually devolved to lower levels as well. Culture differences can be illustrated by the fact that some industrialists are yet to be convinced of the merits of Smart Procurement. For example, the chairman of the Society of British Aerospace Companies commented that "our main worry is that Smart Procurement is full of good ideas, but will they ever be exercised?" (Cook, 1999, p. 37) Industry and the Ministry of Defence operate different reward philosophies, which will be a barrier to cohesion. A good year for a civil servant or military officer means a favourable personnel report, for an industrial executive it is a decent bonus in a profit related pay scheme. (Taylor, 1998, p. 43 ) These differences will have to be carefully managed if team cohesion is not to suffer.
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Integrated Project Teams will represent a shift from current procedures and it is inevitable that there will be some resistance to that change. According to the US Loral Federal Systems (who published ten lessons learned from operating Integrated Product Teams) resistance to implementation is a major obstacle to success. In their opinion, overcoming the resistance means people must "understand the concepts, see the benefit to the project and understand the changes to their role." (Popick & Shead, 1996) the rationale for reform is undeniable, but it is the people from each constituent body that will make the Teams work, and thus it is those people who must be convinced of the real benefit of change.
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The answer is not an obvious one though, and a workforce does not tend to accept change lightly. Many civil servants who have been in their job a long time, are being asked to give up security for flexible employment, potential location changes and a more complex working environment. Integrated Project Teams are about co-ordination and empowerment, which could however be used as a reward.
Potentially, those reluctant to change may be sidelined whilst the proactive are pushed forward to develop their careers. Fundamental to this process of change are education, leadership, the commitment of senior management, and a thoughtful personnel policy.
In this vein, it is encouraging to note the recognition that the skills needed in procurement can no longer be acquired by either osmosis or experience. The projects is an area that must be addressed. (Taylor, 1998, p. 46 Critics of Smart Procurement argue that the success of the Teams will be hindered by the lack of investment. These reforms have emerged in an era where the defence budget remains flat and unit costs of defence equipment maintain a rise of around 10 per cent a year. (Taylor, 1998, p. 41) To this must be added the probability that Integrated Project Teams will require a greater investment and rigour at the front end of the acquisition process in order to ensure capability specifications are met. (Smith, 1998, p. 38) 
Conclusions
To conclude, following years of criticism, the MoD is attempting to modernise and update its procurement system. Central to these measures is the introduction • Information Technology -If it is not possible to overcome geographic separation, Information Technology and Electronic Data Interchange must be exploited to the full to bring stakeholders together within a common electronic network. All parties, including industry, must have the ability to exchange information over an Internet, which must also have the ability to hold online conferences.
• Training and education -This is essential for all stakeholders so that cultural • Independent Regulator -The appointment of an independent regulator would protect the Ministry of Defence from the risk of exploitation by single source suppliers. This idea has already been mooted, and the regulator would have the same role as OFTEL in regards public telecommunications and British
Telecom. (Taylor, 1998, p. 42) A supervisory role during the concept phase of the Acquisition Cycle should be added as well as this would protect the Ministry of Defence from accusations of unfair competition when more than
